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The Brazilian position on the issue of private sector participation in the 
efforts to forestall and resolve emerging markets crises is that there should be 
an approach of contacting and convincing a large number, but not the 
totality, of private creditors. They should be convinced that the international 
public sector loans will allow a transition to stability that is overfinanced in 
case they voluntarily join in by maintaining their exposure to the country, at 
the spreads they choose, and with the counterparts they wish to have as 
clients. We model private sector participation by means of a game. We show 
that the traditional argument that there is a coordination problem among the 
private creditors does not exist in a model without Knightian uncertainty, 
because there is a unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium that involves 
participation. By introducing Knightian uncertainty, we show that if the 
degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion, is high 
enough, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium under uncertainty, which 
involves nonparticipation. Finally, we show that if there is a large enough 
number of private creditors who decrease their uncertainty aversion, then 
again private participation becomes the unique Pareto dominant Nash 
equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty. If we interpret the approach of 
contacting and convincing the private creditors as decreasing their 
uncertainty aversion, then this last result is a justification of the Brazilian 
position. In fact, the private creditors would voluntarily choose to maintain 
their exposures, because private sector participation is the unique Pareto 
dominant Nash equilibrium under uncertainty of the game. 
                                                 
* Banco Central do Brasil, EPGE, Fundação Getúlio Vargas.   5 
 




1. The Brazilian Position 
 
This paper draws upon the previous works on private sector participation presented at 
the Bonn meeting of the extended G-22, on March 11. In particular, we will be referring 
to the contributions of the Canadian delegation (Canada (1999)), the French delegation 
(France (1999)) and the IMF (IMF (1999a, 1999b)). 
 
The Brazilian position on the issue of private sector participation in the efforts to 
forestall and resolve emerging markets crises is that there should be an approach of 
contacting and convincing a large number, but not the totality, of private creditors. They 
should be presented with the agreements between the country and the international 
financial institutions (IFIs), and shown that the international public sector loans will 
allow a transition to stability that is overfinanced in case they voluntarily join in. Joining 
in, in this situation, means that they are supposed to maintain their exposure to the 
country, at the spreads they choose, and with the counterparts they wish to have as 
clients. The Brazilian position is that such a choice should be voluntary, and that they 
will be willing to join by the sheer force of the argument that they will make more 
money if they do so. 
 
We recognize that the cost of taking measures that require involuntary action is very 
high, from past Brazilian experience. In fact, we have tried all possible heterodoxies in 
the eighties and the early nineties. We have had Malaysia-like capital controls in 1983, 
and the result was that for the eleven years following (1984 -1994) the average current 
account deficit was close to zero. In addition, we have had an external moratorium in 
1987, which also did not help our creditworthiness, and did not solve our fiscal problems 
(as was propounded by those who implemented it). The result of this and other 
nonmarket-oriented measures was always for the worse. Nonmarket, involuntary   6 
measures not only are extremely costly in terms of economic efficiency (many broken 
contracts), but also in the end they are not able to stabilize the economy. 
 
As a matter of fact, both IMF documents (IMF (1999a and 1999b)) explicitly recognize 
that the mere possibility that involuntary measures could have been used in the case of 
Brazil, may have contributed to the relatively low rollover rates in October 1998, before 
the announcement of the details of the Fund supported adjustment program. Moreover, 
notice that this happened despite the fact that the Brazilian authorities repudiated up 
front the use of nonmarket measures.  
 
Although the aversion for nonmarket-oriented measures is generally well accepted, in 
regards to private sector participation the story is different. The Brazilian position is far 
from being devoid of controversy. For example, Canada (1999) specifically emphasized 
the need for a framework that would permit countries experiencing a massive capital 
outflow to declare a temporary standstill on debt repayments. France (1999) 
distinguishes the situations, creating a typology of crises. This is a promising path, and 
both the Canadian delegation and the IMF documents have implicit in their arguments a 
classification of cases, according to the intensity of the crisis. However, in the 
conclusion of the French delegation's paper, they show concern that market-friendly 
instruments may not be enough to solve the problem, even in some of the "benign" 
instances. 
 
We model private sector participation by means of a game. The players of the game are 
the private creditors. We show that the traditional argument that there is a coordination 
problem among the private creditors does not exist in a model without Knightian 
uncertainty, because there is a unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium that involves 
participation. By introducing Knightian uncertainty, we show that if the degree of 
uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion, is high enough, then there is a 
unique Nash equilibrium under uncertainty, which involves nonparticipation. Finally, we 
show that if there is a large enough number of private creditors who decrease their 
uncertainty aversion, then again private participation of these banks becomes the unique 
Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty.  
   7 
If we interpret that the approach of contacting and convincing the private creditors as a 
means of lowering their uncertainty aversion (or their degree of uncertainty), then this 
last result may be interpreted as a justification of the Brazilian position. In fact, the 
private creditors would voluntarily choose to maintain their exposures, because private 
sector participation is the unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium under uncertainty of 
the game. Therefore, the model shows that the Brazilian position makes sense in many 
cases, i. e., market-friendly, voluntary participation is possible to be obtained in many 
situations. 
 
Again, the model also allows one to conclude that there may be situations of a country in 
such extreme financing problems that only a nonmarket forced measure would do the 
job, because it could be the case that it would be impossible to lower the uncertainty 
aversion enough to generate the good Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Hence, in 
extreme situations the model predicts that only involuntary measures, like the concerted 
rollover that was employed in the case of Korea, can do the job. This means that the 
model agrees with the intuition, so that it is a suitable tool to analyze the problem of 
private sector participation.  
 
The paper is divided as follows. The next section lays out the model, and solves it 
without Knightian uncertainty. Here we show that the usual view of a coordination 
problem is not present in traditional models without Knightian uncertainty. Then, section 
three introduces Knightian uncertainty, and the two main results are derived. The 
appendix contains some material on Knightian uncertainty, enough to guide the reader 
through the main text. Finally, section four concludes. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
As Canada (1999) points out, two economic problems may justify private sector 
participation. The first is a long run problem, that of moral hazard - if a creditor knows 
that there is going to be bailing out, and then there is no incentive to be careful with the 
loans. The same problem arises in modern banking systems. It turns out that in the case 
of Brazil this is not the central problem. The reason is simple: this is a structural long run 
problem, and the effects on a country would be visible only if the size of the bank lines   8 
had increased substantially, at a lower cost than before. It turns out that trade related 
lines in Brazil remained approximately the same from 1995 until the Russian crisis, with 
no substantial change in the spread. Thus, if we are interested in the economic problem 
of private sector participation in Brazil, this is not the most relevant aspect to consider.  
 
The second is the tendency of markets to display "herding" behavior, including self-
fulfilling "creditor runs". We want to model creditor runs, clearly an important 
phenomenon in the case at hand, because we observed an unusual decrease of trade 
related lines in Brazil after the Russian crisis. 
 
The model is as follows. After the adjustment the country is such that the balance of 
payments is fully financed in the short and long run by direct investments and the loans 
of the international financial institutions, if the private creditors (i. e., banks) maintain 
their exposure to the country in trade related lines. In fact, let us assume that there is a 
yearly financing surplus of Q. That is to say, the banks may decrease their aggregate 
position still by Q and the balance of payments in the short run would be still financed. 
Q is the amount of overfinancing in case the banks join in the effort. Suppose there are n 
identical banks, each one of them with a trade related exposure of b to the country. The 
players of the game are the banks. To simplify the analysis, we assume that any bank has 
only two alternatives: either keep the exposure, or reduce it to zero. Notice that we are 
not considering some intermediate choices like: (a) reducing the exposure but not to 
zero; (b) increasing the spreads; (c) reducing the average maturity of the loans; and (d) 
the bank cannot leave and come back, if it reduces the exposure to zero, it does so 
forever. Obviously, all this aspects could be considered in models that are more 
involved.  
 
The payoff to bank i, where i is a number between 1 and n, is defined as: (i) if bank i 
reduces the exposure to zero, the payoff is 0;  
(iia) if the bank keeps the exposure, and the number of other banks who decide to reduce 
their exposure is less than or equal to the greatest integer less than or equal to Q/b 
(which is also known as the integer part of Q/b, which we denote as [Q/b]), then bank i 
gets s.b/r, where s is the spread related to the transaction, and r is the international 
interest rate (remember - if the bank does not keep the exposure, it reduces to zero for   9 
good, so that it loses the present value of the flow of spreads, which means that the gain 
from keeping is also the present value); 
(iib) if the bank keeps the exposure, and the number of other banks who decide to reduce 
their exposure is greater than [Q/b], then bank i loses the loan, because the country is 
unable to fulfill its foreign currency obligations, which means the payoff is -b. 
 
Observe that we are considering, again for sake of simplicity, that the country does not 
pay any of the banks in the case there is not enough of them to maintain the exposure. It 
is an obvious exaggeration, because, for example, the country could choose to pay them 
proportionately to their exposures. However, for the purpose of the analysis, this will 
suffice. The solution of the game in the absence of Knightian uncertainty is given by the 
proposition below. 
 
Proposition 1. If 0   -1, then there are only two Nash equilibria for this game. 
First, all of the banks keep their exposure, in which case each of them gets s.b/r. Second, 
all of the banks decide to reduce their exposure, in which case each of them gets 0. 
Therefore, there is a unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of the game in which 
banks keep their exposure. 
 
Proof. First, we show that in equilibrium it cannot occur that some banks stay, some 
others leave. In fact, assume that there is an equilibrium in which there are two banks, 
one which keeps and the other which reduces their lines. If the bank that keeps is 
maximizing its payoff, then the number of other banks who reduce their exposure is less 
than or equal to [Q/b]. Thus, consider the case of the bank that does not keep the lines. In 
the perspective of this bank, the number of other banks who do not keep the lines has to 
be less than or equal to [Q/b]-1, which is itself a number less than or equal to [Q/b]. 
Hence, by not keeping this bank is obtaining 0, while if this bank kept the exposure, it 
would get s.b/r, which is a larger number. This would mean that this bank would not be 
optimizing, which is a contradiction. Therefore, there cannot be an equilibrium where 
the banks are acting differently. Now one has to show that both situations, where all of 
them keep their exposure, and where all of them reduce their exposure are Nash 
equilibria. But this follows immediately from the definition of the payoffs, and from the 
assumption that 0   -1. QED. 
   10 
This proposition allows us to claim that the traditional coordination problem does not 
arise. In fact, it suffices that the banks know the structure of the game to see that they 
have only two Nash equilibria, and that there is one in which all of them make more 
money. There is no reason to suppose they would choose the worst equilibrium. The 
problem in the mind of everyone, when one speaks of possible coordination failure in a 
case as such, is different. People have in mind something akin to Knightian uncertainty, 
and that is the topic of the next section.  
 
 
3. Introducing Knightian Uncertainty 
 
Since the beginning of the nineties Knightian uncertainty started being used to analyze 
economic phenomena. The appendix describes the main results. Uncertainty, as 
originally defined by Frank Knight (Knight (1921)), is a situation where agents decide 
without knowing a probability distribution of unknown factors. As opposed to it, Knight 
defines decision under risk as the case in which agents decide with the knowledge of a 
probability distribution behind the unknown factors. The effect of uncertainty in 
economic models has being ignored, mainly because of the very influential book of 
Leonard Savage (Savage (1954)). There, Savage shows that under certain conditions, 
decision under uncertainty (Knightian uncertainty, as we will call it) reduces to decision 
under risk, where the risk is subjective. More recently, since the works of David 
Schmeidler and Itzhak Gilboa, a richer model of Knightian uncertainty was introduced in 
the economic literature. In the econometric literature, Knightian uncertainty is equivalent 
to a generalized version of robustness analysis.  
 
The analysis of games under uncertainty (we will use freely the terms uncertainty and 
Knightian uncertainty as having the same meaning) may be summarized as saying that 
the players get more cautious. Extreme caution is translated into the decision-theoretic 
maxmin behavior. That is to say, an agent has extreme caution if he acts to maximize his 
utility, but taking into account that the worst possible outcome of his actions. In other 
words, for any action a taken, the agent considers the combination of factors that yields 
him the lowest possible utility given that action a. Then he chooses the a that maximizes 
the utility. This is why the name is maxmin: it maximizes the minimum possible utility.  
   11 
In the game above, there is a very interesting phenomenon: the extremely cautious 
(maxmin) behavior of every bank is the same - reduce to zero its exposure. Thus, there is 
a Nash equilibrium that turns out to be also the maxmin behavior. In a simplified version 
of the uncertainty model of Schmeidler-Gilboa, the behavior of the players is a weighted 
average between the usual behavior and maxmin behavior. That is, the players behave as 
though they had a weight 0i  	
 
   
 	 -ci) times the old 
payoff plus ci   times the worst that can happen in case the action is chosen. In the 
appendix, we derive this result, and many more details are given about Schmeidler-
Gilboa's theory of Knightian uncertainty. 
 
The parameter ci  is known as the uncertainty aversion of player i (as defined by Dow 
and Werlang (1992a)). The closer this parameter is to zero, the more the players behave 
as if there were no uncertainty. On the other hand, the closer ci  is to 1, the more cautious 
player i is, that is to say, the more averse to uncertainty he is. We may also think that the 
parameter ci  measures the degree of uncertainty of player i.  
 
This alters the game, and the payoff to bank i, is now modified to:  
(i) if bank i reduces the exposure to zero, the payoff is 0, because this coincides with the 
worst that can happen to it in the case of not keeping the exposure;  
(iia) if the bank keeps the exposure, and the number of other banks who decide to reduce 
their exposure is less than or equal to [Q/b], then bank i gets              (1-ci).s.b/r + ci .(-
b), because the worst that can happen in this case is that more than [Q/b] banks will pull 
out of the country; 
(iib) if the bank keeps the exposure, and the number of other banks who decide to reduce 
their exposure is greater than [Q/b], then bank i's payoff is -b, because this is already the 
worst that can happen to it under these circumstances. 
 
The solution of this game is given below. 
 
Proposition 2. Let k be the number of i's such that the uncertainty aversion parameter ci  
is less than s/(s+r). Suppose that there are n-k of the banks such that ci  is greater than 
s/(s+r). We avoid limit cases of equality, because they are obvious, but tedious to deal 
with.    12 
(i) If k is less than n - [Q/b], then there is only one Nash equilibrium under uncertainty, 
where all banks reduce their exposure to zero.  
(ii) If k is larger than or equal to n - [Q/b], then there are only two Nash equilibria under 
uncertainty: one where all banks reduce to zero their exposure, and the other where all k 
banks with low uncertainty aversion keep their exposure, but the other n-k do not. The 
latter equilibrium is the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium under uncertainty. 
 
Proof. If the bank is such that its uncertainty aversion parameter is greater than s/(s+r), 
then it is easy to see that reducing to zero the exposure is a strictly dominant strategy. 
This takes care of the case where k is less than n - [Q/b], because n-k will be greater than 
[Q/b], which means that there will be more than [Q/b] banks that will reduce to zero the 
exposure, so that even the banks with low uncertainty aversion will have as an 
optimizing choice the reduction of the exposure to zero. This shows (i). To show (ii), 
notice that for the banks with low aversion to uncertainty (i. e., ci  < s/(s+r)), the optimal 




This proposition allows us to analyze private sector participation in a more realistic 
setup. First, there is a cutoff level of the uncertainty aversion, s/(s+r), such that if the 
banks have a higher uncertainty aversion, they will pull out of the country, which means 
that if there are enough of those, the other banks will find optimal to reduce their 
exposure to zero too. This cutoff level is increasing in the spread, and decreasing with 
the international interest rates. Note that for the values of 2% per year for the spread, and 
5.5% per year for the interest rate (approximate dollar values), we have the cutoff of the 
uncertainty aversion parameter at 0.267, a relatively high number. The uncertainty 
aversion of the banks may be interpreted as reflecting their fear that there will be 
problems with the implementation of the international financial institutions' program. 
Here we also see that allowing the banks to set the spreads freely may be a powerful 
incentive to increase the cutoff of the uncertainty aversion parameter, which means a 
better chance of obtaining the good equilibrium.  
 
Second, if enough of the banks (at least n - [Q/b]) have an uncertainty aversion which is 
smaller than the cutoff level, then we again get the good case, in which there will be a   13 
Pareto dominant equilibrium with private sector voluntary participation. It is here that 
we interpret this result as a justification of the Brazilian viewpoint. The Brazilian 
position may be seen as a device to decrease the uncertainty aversion parameter of the 
banks, by means of a very close contact, where all the details of the international 
financial help are shown. Obviously, the game assumes implicitly that there is full 
monitoring of the actions of others. This is also an interpretation of the role of 
monitoring systems, to have reality resemble the game the most possible. Additionally, 
the banks will be more likely to participate the more slack they see in the program, so 
that short term delays in the decision to maintain the lines would not substantially affect 
the country. 
 
All of the conditions above are met in the case of Brazil. In addition, it is fundamental, 






We have shown a game theoretic model that we believe to be the appropriate framework 
to study private sector participation. From the game theoretic viewpoint, two are the 
facts we implicitly assume. First, in a coordination game with two Nash equilibria, 
where one is a Pareto dominant equilibrium, then this will be the equilibrium chosen by 
all the participants (note that this used to be a big controversy among game theorists 
during the eighties, but this discussion is considered somewhat sterile right now). 
Second, the introduction of Knightian uncertainty captures all the intuition of those who 
thought that the dominated Nash equilibria without uncertainty could be chosen. In this 
case the Pareto dominated Nash equilibrium is also the maxmin (extremely cautious) 
equilibrium. This is the real dilemma in people's mind: caution X profit. Knightian 
uncertainty allows a precise modeling of this phenomenon. 
 
The players of the game are the private creditors, or banks. We show that the traditional 
argument that there is a coordination problem among the private creditors does not exist 
is in a model without Knightian uncertainty, because there is a unique Pareto dominant 
Nash equilibrium that involves participation. By introducing Knightian uncertainty, we   14 
show that if the degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion, is high 
enough, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium under uncertainty, which involves 
nonparticipation. We also show that if there is a large enough number of private 
creditors who decrease their uncertainty aversion, then again private participation of 
these banks becomes the unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium under Knightian 
uncertainty. 
 
Finally, the uncertainty aversion parameter is a perfect one-dimensional tool to classify 
the countries according to the severity of the crisis it faces. Given that, the intuition 
behind the works of Canada (1999), France (1999) and IMF (1999a and 1999b) may be 
translated into this model. The model also allows one to clarify the role of monitoring: to 
disseminate the knowledge about the actions of the other players of the game. And the 
fact that in many cases the voluntary approach to the problem of private sector 
participation may be successful is also shown not to be incompatible with the intuition of 
the works already cited. Hence, this is a theoretical justification of the Brazilian position. 
    
 
 
Appendix: Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty 
 
This appendix draws upon material from Dow and Werlang (1992b), Dow, Simonsen 
and Werlang (1993) and Dow and Werlang (1994). Schmeidler (1982, 1989) and Gilboa 
(1987) have developed an axiomatic model of rational decision-making in which agents' 
behavior distinguishes between situations where agents know the probability 
distributions of random variables and situations where they do not have this information. 
We refer to the former as risk and the latter as uncertainty, or Knightian uncertainty (as 
defined by Knight (1921)). Synonyms that are used in the literature include roulette 
lottery, for risk, and horse lottery and ambiguity, for uncertainty. The traditional model 
of uncertainty used in economics is that of Savage (1954), which reduces all problems of 
uncertainty to risk under a subjective probability. The axiomatization of Schmeidler-
Gilboa leads to very distinct behavior: behavior under uncertainty is inherently different 
from behavior under risk. We now give a brief exposition of the main aspects of their 
model. The reader is referred to the papers by Schmeidler and Gilboa cited above for a 
complete description and for the underlying axioms, and to Dow and Werlang (1992a),   15 
which contains an example and an application to portfolio choice (it also includes a 
mathematical appendix with all basic material on non-additive probabilities). Dow and 
Werlang (1992b) have an explanation of the excess volatility puzzle, and Simonsen and 
Werlang(1991) also describe the implications for portfolio choice.   
   16 
The Schmeidler-Gilboa model predicts that agents' behavior will be represented by a 
utility function and a (subjective) non-additive probability distribution. A non-additive 
probability P reflecting aversion to uncertainty satisfies the condition 
 
P(A) + P(B)  ∪B) + P(A∩B),                 (*) 
 
rather than the stronger condition satisfied by (additive) probabilities 
  
P(A) + P(B) = P(A∪B) + P(A∩B). 
   
In particular, P(A) + P(Ac) may be less than 1; the difference can be thought of as a 
measure of the uncertainty aversion attached by the agent to the event A. The uncertainty 
aversion of P at event A is c(P,A) = 1 - P(A) - P(Ac) (Dow and Werlang(1992a)). 
 
All the non-additive probabilities considered in this paper will reflect uncertainty 
aversion, i.e. they will satisfy inequality (*). In addition, we will restrict attention to the 
case of a finite set of states of the world. 
 
The agent maximizes expected utility under a non-additive distribution, where the 
expectation of a non-negative random variable X is defined as: 
[] () ∫
+ ℜ
≥ = dx x X P X E .  
 
Associated with a non-additive probability P is a set ∆ of additive probabilities called the 
core of P, which is defined (analogously to the core in cooperative game theory) as the 
set of additive probability measures  π such that π(A)    
 	   -
additive probability satisfies the inequality (*) (reflecting aversion to uncertainty) the 
core is non-empty. A closely related model of behavior under uncertainty is for the agent 
to act to maximize the minimum value, over the elements of the core, of expected utility 
(Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). 
 
The support of a non-additive probability P may be defined analogously to the additive 
case.  
   17 
Definition: a support of a non-additive probability P is an event A such that        P(Ac) = 
0 and P(Bc) > 0 for all events B     ⊃ B. 
   
It should be clear that there might be several supports. Also note that any support must 
be contained in the smallest set S such that P(S)=1. 
 
Now, let us move to games. The concept of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty was 
proposed by Dow and Werlang (1994). Broadly speaking, it is a weighted average of 
Nash and maxmin that unifies two apparently conflicting views of rational behavior in a 
game. Let us develop the heuristics of the idea, and then proceed to a formal definition. 
 
Let Γ=(A1, A2, u1, u2) be a two-person finite game (also known as a bi-matrix game) 
where the Ai's are pure strategy sets and ui's are utilities (payoffs). This will be called the 
primitive game, or game without uncertainty. For i=1 and 2, define ui(ai) = minaj ∈ Aj 









against "the devil". ("The devil" is a fictitious player whose objective is to always choose 
the action that will hurt player 1 the most.)  The game with constant degree of 
uncertainty (measured by the uncertainty aversion) c1 for player I and c2 for player II (0
c1  
  #$  2   	  -matrix game Γ'=(A1, A2, u'1, u'2), where u'i(ai, aj) = (1-
ci).ui(ai, aj) + ci.ui(ai), j% & 
# ' 
 
A Nash equilibrium in this new game is defined as a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty 
in the primitive game. An interpretation of this new game is that each player attributes a 
certain probability that the other player will behave irrationally, acting like the devil. 
With zero uncertainty one gets the usual definition of Nash equilibrium. With 100% 
uncertainty for every player, an equilibrium is a combination of maxmin strategies. 
 
It is easy to check that if (ã1, ã2) is at the same time a Nash equilibrium and a 
combination of maxmin strategies of the primitive game, then it is also a Nash 
equilibrium of the game with any given constant degree of uncertainty.  
 
Let us now generalize the definition of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty. The point of 
departure will be a well-known definition of mixed strategy in standard theory: an   18 
additive probability on the space of pure strategies of the player. As before, we restrict 
attention to two-person finite games Γ=(A1, A2, u1, u2). In the standard theory, a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium can be defined as follows. Let (µ1, µ2) be a pair of (additive) 
probability measures and let supp[µi] denote the support of µi. In Nash equilibrium, 
every a1 ∈ supp[µ1] is a best response to µ2, i.e. a1 maximizes the expected utility of 
player 1 given that player 2 is playing the mixed strategy µ2; conversely, every a2 
∈ supp[µ2] is a best response to µ1. A subjective interpretation can be given to the Nash 
equilibrium:  the mixed strategy of player 1, µ1, may be viewed as the beliefs that player 
2 has about the pure strategy play of player 1. Conversely, the mixed strategy of player 2, 
µ2, may be viewed as the beliefs player 1 has about the pure strategy play of player 2. 
 
Now, under uncertainty, what happens is that each player no longer views the strategy of 
the other player as an additive, but as a subadditive probability on the other player's 
strategy space. Moreover, we have assumed up to now that the degree of uncertainty 
c(P,A) is constant for each player. This assumption can be lifted in a general definition. 
The definition below appeared before in Dow and Werlang (1994). 
 
Definition:  We say that a pair (P1, P2) of subadditive probabilities (all our non-additive 
probabilities will satisfy inequality (1) above), P1 over A1 and P2 over A2 is a Nash 
Equilibrium under Uncertainty if there exists a support of P1 and a support of P2 such 
that: 
(i) for all a1 in the support of P1, a1 maximizes the expected utility of player 1 given that 
player 1 beliefs about the strategies of  player 2  are P2, and conversely;  
(ii) for all a2 in the support of P2, a2 maximizes the expected utility of player 2 given 
that player 2 beliefs about the strategies of  player 1 are P1. 
 
The definition above reduces to the standard definition of Nash equilibrium, whenever 
there is no uncertainty (which means that the P's are additive). One could speculate why 
we have not used the smallest set of probability one instead of a support in the definition 
above. The reason is that this set is "too large", and the equilibrium notion thus resulting 
would be too strong, as well. In fact, the great strength of non-additive models is that an 
event may be infinitely more likely than its complement, but still have probability less   19 
than one. Take, for example, the case of a strategy set with two elements, a and b. 
Suppose P(a)=0.8 and P(b)=0. If we want to be "sure" that an event is going to happen, 
then this event has to be the whole strategy set, because it is the smallest set with 
probability one. However, the likelihood that the strategy a is going to be used is infinite 
relative to b (i.e. the relative likelihood that strategy b is going to be used is zero). Thus, 
in this case, it would be fair to interpret that strategy b has no chance of happening. 
Clearly, a standard mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium under 
uncertainty.  
 
In addition, it is easy to see that the definition above reduces to the heuristic definition 
given before. In fact, consider the case of a uniform squeeze, i.e., P(A) = (1-c)Q(A), for 
A distinct from the whole set of strategies. From Dow and Werlang (1992a) uniform 
squeezes have constant uncertainty aversion equal to c and the expected value of a 
positive random variable X is given by 
 
EP[X] = c.min X + (1-c).EQ[X]. 
 
If we find the Nash equilibria under uncertainty where the subadditive probabilities of 
the players are in this class, we obtain the same equilibria as above. (To see that is 
simple: one has to check that the (standard) mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the 
modified game (Γ') correspond to the Q's of the Nash equilibria under uncertainty of the 
primitive game.)  Hence, we have the following theorem (Dow and Werlang (1994)). 
 
Theorem. Let Γ=(A1, A2, u1, u2) be a two-person finite game, and                       (c1, c2) 
∈ [0,1] X[0,1]. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium (P1, P2), where both P1 and P2 
exhibit constant uncertainty aversion, such that c1 is the uncertainty aversion of P2  and 
c2 is the uncertainty aversion of P1 . The reason for the interchange in the subscripts is 
that P2  is what player 1 thinks player 2 is going to do, so that the uncertainty aversion of 
P2  is a characteristic of player 1, and vice-versa. 
 
Furthermore, in the heuristic discussion above, we have a practical method to compute 
Nash equilibria under Knightian uncertainty - just modify the game Γ to Γ', and calculate 
the usual mixed strategy Nash equilibria of Γ'. This is the procedure used in the text.   20 
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